Dr Kelly mentions 'symptoms that are clearly those of a reactive depression'. This is fogging the issue. That a person may be distressed, worried and concerned about his circumstances is very understandable, but to suggest that a perfectly reasonable and understandable reaction to a life situation should be diagnosed as a reactive depression is unacceptable. No doubt this indulgence in psychiatric jargon and the diagnosis of 'reactive depression' adds to the mystique of psychiatry, . but it has no other merit. It is preferable merely to state that the subject is worried about the litigation, his financial position or whatever else concerns him and leave it at that, rather than to promote such normal concern to the status of illness. There is a world of qualitative difference between being unhappy and being clinically depressed.
Dr Michael Trimble (see above) makes the unwarranted assumption that because the brain is involved in subjects presenting with posttraumatic syndrome, this necessarily implies that such subjects are sick. This is fallacious. As Szasz pointed out (1962, The Myth of Mental Illness. Seeker and Warburg, New York), war may be a matter of politics and ethics but the fact that physical agents of destruction are used in warfare does not make it a problem in physics. Likewise, the use of the brain or the body does not make all manner of human activity a problem in psychiatry or medicine and it is quite wrong to regard all forms of human suffering as falling into the class of illness. Further, it is logically false to assume that because someone has complaints, they are sick until proved otherwise. That is, as Szasz pointed out, rather like postulating the existence of God on the basis of faith in a deity and placing the burden of disproof on others.
What Dr Trimble needs to explain is why, following a trivial head injury or minor trauma to a peripheral part of the body in an industrial accident, and in the absence of any demonstrable pathology, there should be persistent subjective complaints. A perfectly reasonable explanation is the concern and anxiety which arises, not as a result of any physical or emotional trauma sustained at the time of the accident but as a reflection of the subject's role as a litigant. The feeling of resentment at being what the subject regards as the innocent victim of somebody else's negligence and the knowledge that the greater the suffering (and the longer they are off work) the greater will be the damages, are potent factors for the subject to adopt the sick role. Nor is the situation helped by the defendant insurance company who, initially at least, denies liability as a legal ploy. Nothing is more calculated to infuriate the plaintiff than for him to be informed that his employer regards him as wholly or partially to blame for the accident, especially when be believes -usually on very good groundsthat he is entirely innocent of any blame; and the matter is not helped by the denial of liability until the very last moment. The situation is further compounded by the often initially low offer of compensation, which angers the plaintiff even more, with hints that it is not in his interests to resume work until the litigation is finished. In all these circumstances, is it in any way surprising that so many plaintiffs are bitter and resentful and present with headache, 'depression', irritability, etc? Unlike Dr Trimble, I do not need to speculate about possible obscure cerebral pathology to account for the picture presented, especially when it is patently obvious that it is in the subject's interests to go on complaining so long as the legal issues are unresolved.
Finally, might I suggest that in many of these cases of post-traumatic syndrome, it would be far more profitable if the doctor were to ask himself 'Why is this subject presenting in this way?' rather than 'What is wrong with this patient?' To ask the latter question makes an unwarranted assumption, namely that because a subject sits down in front of a doctor he is, by definition, sick and therefore a patient.. It is then only too easy to 'diagnose' something as being wrong -which indeed there might be -but to ask the first Barritt and Jordan (November Journal, p 852) are unduly sanguine about their ability accurately to diagnose pulmonary embolism using the methods available in 1960. Two larger studies, using angiography and post-mortem data to establish the pathology, have concluded that the accuracy of clinical diagnosis is closer to 40% (Hildner & Ormond 1967 ,Modan et al. 1972 .
I doubt whether most physicians would consider haemoptysis and pleuritic chest pain as indicating pulmonary infarction. On one medical ward in the last month I have seen three cases of undoubted pneumococcal pneumonia presenting with pleuritic chest pain and haemoptysis.
It has become increasingly clear over recent years that clinical impressions are a very poor judge of therapeutic efficacy in self-limiting disorders, particularly where expectation of benefit is high.
It is clear that clinical expectations of oral anticoagulants, for example, were very high from the outset. In the words of the discoverer of bishydroxycoumarin, Paul Link, after rudimentary studies in animal toxicology, this drug was 'grabbed from his hands by the clinicians'. The curious situation has arisen where, rather than the proponents of anticoagulant therapy having to prove benefits from this treatment, sceptics, like myself, are placed in the impossible situation of having to prove that they donot work.
The issue is clouded somewhat by a semantic confusion. Anticoagulants are undoubtedly effective in preventing clot formation. As long as clinicians talk loosely about 'clots in the lungs', many will feel subconsciously that any formal demonstration of therapeutic benefit is superfluous. However, the structure and composition of a clot in a test tube is very different from that of a thrombus in a vein. The evidence for an anti thrombotic effect of anticoagulants in humans is elusive.
An interesting analogy may be found in the anticoagulant treatment of myocardial infarction (MI). In the days when it was commonly assumed that MI was caused by in situ thrombosis, anticoagulants were in widespread use for this disease and the results of several large trials were even more spectacular than the results reported by Barritt & Jordan (1960) for pulmonary embolism. Gifford & Feinstein (1969) have pointed out that the most impressive results were obtained in the trials with the poorest experimental design. Now that the theory of pathophysiology has changed somewhat, anticoagulants have falIen out of favour in this application.
It is important to emphasize that heparin and warfarin are very dangerous drugs, The mortality of heparin in one prospective trial has been 2%, the morbidity close to 40% (Salzmann et al. 1975) . It is ethicalIy unacceptable to use these drugs in the vague hope that they may be doing some good, or simply because no better treatment is available. Yours sincerely PAULEGERMAYER 30 August 1981
